美联储关于CBDC演讲全文：对稳定币、比特币、CBDC的全面宏观理解

美联储关于CBDC演讲全文：对稳定币、比特币、CBDC的全面宏观理解
2021/7/1 8:00:00 易口才

美联储委员会委员、监管副主席Randal K. Quarles 6月28日在演讲中表示，美元在支付领域的数字化程度相当高。其它国家的央行数字货币，不一定必然构成对美元储备货币地位的威胁，还有其它决定因素。美元央行数字货币的好处不明显，甚至可能阻碍私人企业的创新。只要构建得当，锚定美元的稳定币对维护美元的全球地位有益，比特币最终只是投机性资产，对美元构不成威胁。他给美元央行数字货币的推动者，泼了一头凉水，笑他们头脑发热。

     以下是美联储监管副主席演讲的全文翻译： I have been reflecting recently, and in connection with this speech, on America's centuries-long enthusiasm for novelty. In the main, it has served us and the world well, by making America the home of so many of the scientific and practical innovations that have transformed life in the 21st century from that of the 19th. But, especially when coupled with an equally American susceptibility to boosterism and the fear of missing out, it has also sometimes led to a mass suspension of our critical thinking and to occasionally impetuous, deluded crazes or fads.Sometimes the consequences are in hindsight merely puzzling or embarrassing, like that year in the 1980s when millions of Americans suddenly started wearing parachute pants. But the consequences can also be more serious.Which brings us to my topic today: central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs. In recent months, public interest in a "digital dollar" has reached fever pitch. A wide range of experts and commenters have suggested that the Federal Reserve should issue—and in fact may need to issue—a CBDC. But before we get carried away with the novelty, I think we need to subject the promises of a CBDC to a careful critical analysis. In offering my views on this and other issues related to CBDCs, I am speaking for myself as a member of the Board of Governors, and not for the Board itself or any other Fed policymakers. And, indeed, you will all have seen Chair Powell's recent announcement that we are preparing a comprehensive discussion paper on this issue that will be the first step in a thorough public process to conduct just this sort of critical analysis, which I do not want to prejudge. But I do want to give some sense of the issues I think we will need to grapple with in this process, how I will be thinking about them, and the high bar that I think any proposal to create a U.S. CBDC must clear.So, let's begin with a basic question: what problem would a CBDC solve? To answer, we first need to define the term CBDC and assess the current state of the U.S. payment system.我最近一直在反思美国数百年来对新鲜事物的热情。总体上讲，我们对新鲜事物的热情，使美国成为许多科学和实践创新的发源地，从19世纪到21世纪，不断改变着我们的生活，有益于美国和世界。

     但是，这种热情，一旦夹杂着美国人好赞美、爱敢潮流的特点，有时会导致我们的批判性思维短暂缺失，变得浮躁、狂热。其结果有时令人费解或尴尬，就像80年代，数百万美国人突然着迷于穿降落伞裤。有时会带来严重的后果。

     我今天的演讲主题：美国央行数字货币(以下统称“美元CBDC“或CBDC)。最近几个月，公众对“数字美元”的兴趣达到了高潮。许多专家和评论者敦促美联储应该发行CBDC，事实上可能也需要发行。但在我们对新鲜事物感到激动不已时，需要对CBDC进行仔细的批判性分析。

     我是以美联储委员会成员的身份，就CBDC相关问题发表看法，不代表委员会，也不代表其他美联储政策制定者。

     鲍威尔主席最近宣布，我们正在准备一份关于这个问题的综合性文件，这将是进行这种批判性分析的公开程序的第一步，我不想对此做出预判。我想就如何理智地去思考CBDC面临的各种问题，我自己如何考虑这些问题，以及美国的CBDC应该满足的标准，谈谈我的看法。

     那么，让我们从一个基本问题开始：CBDC要解决什么问题？要回答这个问题，我们首先需要定义CBDC ，并评估美国支付系统的现状。

     What Do We Mean by "CBDC"?The Bank for International Settlements has defined a CBDC as "a digital payment instrument, denominated in the national unit of account, that is a direct liability of the central bank."1My first observation is that the general public already transacts mostly in digital dollars—by sending and receiving electronic balances in our commercial bank accounts. These digital dollars are not a CBDC, because they are liabilities of commercial banks rather than the Federal Reserve. Importantly, however, digital dollars at commercial banks are federally insured up to $250,000, which means that for deposits up to that amount—which means for essentially all retail deposits in the United States—they are as sound as a central bank liability.The Federal Reserve also provides digital dollars directly to commercial banks and certain other financial institutions. Federal law allows these financial institutions to maintain accounts with—and receive payments services from—the Federal Reserve. Balances in Federal Reserve accounts serve a vital financial stability function by providing a safe and liquid settlement asset for the U.S. economy.To summarize then, the dollar is already highly digitized. The Federal Reserve provides a digital dollar to commercial banks, and commercial banks provide digital dollars and other financial services to consumers and businesses. This arrangement serves the nation and the economy well: the Federal Reserve functions in the public interest by promoting the health of the U.S. economy and the stability of the broader financial system, while commercial banks compete to attract and effectively serve customers.So, given the existing digitization of the U.S. dollar, how would a CBDC differ from the digital dollars we use today? The key distinction is that, when most commentators speculate about a Federal Reserve CBDC, they assume that it would be available to the general public directly from the central bank. A CBDC of this nature could take different forms. One is an account-based model, in which the Federal Reserve would provide individual accounts directly to the general public. Like the accounts that the Federal Reserve currently provides to financial institutions, an accountholder would send and receive funds by debit or credit to their Federal Reserve account.A different CBDC model could involve a CBDC that is not maintained in Federal Reserve accounts. This form of CBDC would be closer to a digital equivalent of cash. Like cash, it would represent a claim against the Federal Reserve, but it could potentially be transferred from person to person (like a banknote) or through intermediaries.I am skeptical that the Federal Reserve has legal authority to pursue either of these CBDC models without legislation. Nevertheless, the recent clamor over CBDCs makes it appropriate to explore the benefits, costs, and practicalities of implementing one in the United States if such legislative authority were granted. Let's start with a look at the current U.S. payment system that a Fed CBDC would fit into.

     「CBDC」是什么意思？ 国际清算银行将 CBDC 定义为「一种数字支付工具，以国家记账单位计价，是中央银行的直接负债。」我的第一个观点，普通民众已经普遍以数字美元进行交易，通过转入转出商业银行账户中的电子余额。当然，这些数字美元并非 CBDC，因为这是商业银行的负债而非美联储。不过，重要的一点是商业银行的数字美元在联邦保险范围内最高可承保 25 万美元。这意味着在商业银行存放 25 万美元以下的存款与央行负债一样稳健。美联储还直接向商业银行和某些其他金融机构提供数字美元。联邦法律允许这些金融机构在美联储开立账户，并从美联储接受支付服务。美联储账户中的余额通过为美国经济提供安全和流动的结算资产，发挥了重要的金融稳定功能。总而言之，美元已经高度数字化。美联储向商业银行提供数字美元，商业银行向消费者和企业提供数字美元和其他金融服务。这种安排很好地为国家和经济服务：美联储通过促进美国经济的健康和更广泛的金融体系的稳定，为公众利益服务，而商业银行则通过竞争来吸引和有效服务客户。那么，考虑到美元现有的数字化，CBDC 与我们今天使用的数字美元有何不同？关键的区别是，当大多数评论员推测美联储 CBDC 时，他们假设公众可以直接从中央银行获得它。这种性质的 CBDC 可以采取不同的形式。一种是基于账户的模式，其中美联储将直接向公众提供个人账户。就像美联储目前向金融机构提供的账户一样，账户持有人将通过借记或贷记向其美联储账户发送和接收资金。另一种不同的 CBDC 模式可能涉及不在美联储账户中保存的 CBDC。这种形式的 CBDC 将更接近于现金的数字等价物。与现金一样，它代表对美联储的索赔，但它可能会在人与人之间(如钞票)或通过中间人转移。我对美联储是否有法律权力在没有立法的情况下推行这些 CBDC 模式表示怀疑。然而，如果这种立法授权被授予的话，那么我们就有必要探讨在美国实施 CBDC 的好处、成本和实用性。接下来让我们看看美联储 CBDC 是否适合的当前美国支付系统。 Current State of the U.S. Payment SystemThe Federal Reserve and private-sector interbank payment services already offer an array of options that facilitate efficient, electronic U.S. dollar payments. A few statistics related to the main large-value payment systems for U.S. dollars are illustrative. The Federal Reserve's large-value payment service (the Fedwire Funds Service) processes nearly $4 trillion in payments every day.2 These payments settle instantly in a bank's account at the Federal Reserve. A private-sector entity (The Clearing House) operates a large-value payment system that settles nearly $2 trillion in payments every day.3 These payments do not settle in Federal Reserve accounts, but they are underpinned by balances on the books of a Federal Reserve Bank.Smaller-value payments often settle more slowly than large-value payments, but a variety of efforts to speed up settlement have been completed or are underway. For example, The Clearing House has developed an instant payments service that focuses on smaller-value payments. Similarly, the automated clearinghouse (or ACH) network—a batch-based payment network that first developed in the long-ago 20th century—now enables same-day settlement of ACH payments. And the Federal Reserve is developing an instant payment service—FedNow?—that will soon provide recipients of small-value payments with immediate access to their funds in commercial bank accounts.The payment system is not perfect—some types of payments should move more quickly and efficiently. Payments across international borders, for example, remain a key area of concern because they often involve high costs, low speed, and insufficient transparency. The Financial Stability Board, an international group that I chair, produced a roadmap last year that is intended to address these concerns.4 Additionally, private-sector stablecoins (which I will discuss in more detail in a moment) may facilitate faster and cheaper cross-border payments.In addition, some types of payments have not fully digitized or are subject to ongoing contention between businesses with competing economic interests. For example, paper checks remain widely used for certain types of payments (although the interbank check collection process is now almost entirely electronic).5 Debit and credit card payments offer a convenient digital platform for consumers and retailers, but there has been considerable controversy between banks and retailers over who will capture the economics surrounding the fees associated with card transactions.Finally, many more Americans could benefit from digital payments by increasing their use of banking services, which can be promoted by wider use of low-cost, basic bank accounts.In summary, the U.S. payment system is very good, and although it is not perfect, work is already underway to significantly improve it.

     美国支付系统的现状

     美联储和私营部门银行间支付服务已经提供了一系列选项，以促进高效的电子美元支付。与主要的美元大额支付系统相关的一些统计数据具有说明性。

     美联储的大额支付服务(Fedwire Funds Service)每天处理近4万亿美元的支付。这些支付在美联储的银行账户中即时结算。一家私营部门(清算所)运营着一个大额支付系统，每天对近2万亿美元的支付进行结算。这些支付不在美联储账户结算，但由美联储储备银行的账户存款支撑。

     小额支付通常比大额支付结算更慢，但加快结算速度的各种努力已经完成或正在进行中。例如，清算所开发了一种即时支付服务，专注于小额支付。同样，自动清算中心(或ACH)，一个20世纪开发的基于批量的支付网络，现在可支持支付的当日结算。美联储正在开发一种即时支付服务FedNow?，该服务将很快让小额支付的接收者能够随时获得他们在商业银行账户中的资金。

     支付系统并不完美，某些类型的支付应该更快更有效。例如，跨境支付仍然是一个值得关注的关键领域，它们通常成本高、速度慢和透明度不足。我担任主席的国际组织金融稳定委员会，去年制定了一份路线图，旨在解决这些问题。私营部门的稳定币(我稍后将详细讨论)可能会促进更快、更便宜的跨境支付。

     此外，某些类型的支付，受制于具有竞争性经济利益的企业之间持续争议的影响，尚未完全数字化。例如，纸质支票仍然广泛用于某些类型的支付(尽管银行间支票收款流程几乎完全电子化)。借记卡和信用卡支付为消费者和零售商提供了方便的数字平台，但银行和零售商之间，就谁将获得与卡交易相关的费用经济性方面，一直争执不休。

     最后，通过推动低成本的基本银行账户，使更多的美国人能得到银行的服务，从而受益于数字支付。

     综上所述，美国的支付系统非常好，虽然还不算十全十美，但已经在进行各种改进工作，效果显著。 Policy ConsiderationsYet, proponents of a Federal Reserve CBDC believe that it would solve a number of significant problems. They suggest, for example, that a Federal Reserve CBDC may be necessary to defend the critical role the U.S. dollar plays in the global economy. Others say that a CBDC would overcome longstanding economic inequalities in American society. As we begin our Fed analysis of these issues, I will have to be convinced that a CBDC is a particularly good tool to address either of these issues, about which I am skeptical, and I will especially have to be convinced that the potential benefits of developing a Federal Reserve CBDC outweigh the potential risks.Let's examine some of the arguments raised by CBDC supporters. The first argument is that the Federal Reserve should develop a CBDC to defend the U.S. dollar against threats that would be posed by foreign CBDCs, on the one hand, and the continued spread of private digital currencies, on the other.Taking the threat from foreign CBDC's first, this argument presumes that at least some foreign currencies—all of which are already highly digitized in our current international banking system in the same way the dollar is and yet which do not pose a significant challenge to the international role of the dollar—will suddenly pose a much greater challenge to the dollar if that digitization is accomplished through a direct central bank digital currency instead of through the current digital payments system. In this view, the U.S. dollar will lose its place in the global economy if the Federal Reserve does not offer a similar product.I think it's inevitable that, as the global economy and financial system continue to evolve, some foreign currencies (including some foreign CBDCs) will be used more in international transactions than they currently are. It seems unlikely, however, that the dollar's status as a global reserve currency, or the dollar's role as the dominant currency in international financial transactions, will be threatened by a foreign CBDC. The dollar's role in the global economy rests on a number of foundations, including the strength and size of the U.S. economy; extensive trade linkages between the United States and the rest of the world; deep financial markets, including for U.S. Treasury securities; the stable value of the dollar over time; the ease of converting U.S. dollars into foreign currencies; the rule of law and strong property rights in the United States; and last but not least, credible U.S. monetary policy. None of these are likely to be threatened by a foreign currency, and certainly not because that foreign currency is a CBDC.CBDC supporters also suggest that private digital currencies pose a threat to the U.S. dollar. Private digital currencies come in multiple flavors, but for this purpose I will divide them into two categories: stablecoins and non-stablecoins, or cryptoassets, such as bitcoin. Let's begin with stablecoins. The value of a stablecoin is tied to one or more other assets, such as a sovereign currency.6 There are multiple existing and potential stablecoins that are or would be tied in value to the U.S. dollar.Some commentators argue that the United States must develop a CBDC to compete with U.S. dollar stablecoins. Stablecoins are an important development that raise difficult questions. For example, how would widespread adoption of stablecoins affect monetary policy or financial stability? How might stablecoins affect the commercial banking system? Do stablecoins represent a fundamental threat to the government's role in money creation?In my judgment, we do not need to fear stablecoins. The Federal Reserve has traditionally supported responsible private-sector innovation. Consistent with this tradition, I believe that we must take strong account of the potential benefits of stablecoins, including the possibility that a U.S. dollar stablecoin might support the role of the dollar in the global economy. For example, a global U.S. dollar stablecoin network could encourage use of the dollar by making cross-border payments faster and cheaper, and it potentially could be deployed much faster and with fewer downsides than a CBDC. And the concern that stablecoins represent the unprecedented creation of private money and thus challenge our monetary sovereignty is puzzling, given that our existing system involves—indeed depends on—private firms creating money every day.We do have a legitimate and strong regulatory interest in how stablecoins are constructed and managed, particularly with respect to financial stability concerns: the pool of assets that acts as the anchor for a stablecoin's value could—if use of the stablecoin became widespread enough—create stability risk if it is invested in multiple currency denominations; if it is a fractional rather than full reserve; if the stablecoin holder does not have a clear claim on the underlying asset; or if the pool is invested in instruments other than the most liquid possible, principally central bank reserves and short-term sovereign bonds. All of these factors create "run risk" —the possibility that some triggering event could cause a large number of stablecoin holders to exchange their coins all at once for other assets and that the stablecoin system would not be able to meet such demands while maintaining a reasonably stable value. But these concerns are eminently addressable—indeed, some stablecoins have already been structured to address them. When our concerns have been addressed, we should be saying yes to these products, rather than straining to find ways to say no. Indeed, the combination of imminent improvements in the existing payments system such as various instant payments initiatives combined with the cross-border efficiency of properly structured stablecoins could well make superfluous any effort to develop a CBDC.In contrast to stablecoins, cryptoassets like bitcoin are not tied to the value of an asset like a sovereign currency. Rather, they seek to create value in the coin through other means, usually some intrinsic mechanism to ensure scarcity, like bitcoin's mining process, or some characteristic of the coin that cannot be matched by the traditional payment system, such as inviolable anonymity. Some commentators assert that the United States must develop a CBDC to counter the appeal of cryptocurrencies. This seems mistaken. The mechanisms used to create such cryptoassets' value also ensure that this value will be highly volatile—rather similar to the fluctuating value of gold, which, like bitcoin, draws a significant part of its value from its scarcity, and like bitcoin, does not play a significant role in today's payments or monetary system. Unlike gold, however, which has industrial uses and aesthetic attributes quite apart from its vestigial financial role, bitcoin's principal additional attractions are its novelty and its anonymity. The anonymity will make it appropriately the target for increasingly comprehensive scrutiny from law enforcement and the novelty is a rapidly wasting asset. Gold will always glitter, but novelty, by definition, fades. Bitcoin and its ilk will, accordingly, almost certainly remain a risky and speculative investment rather than a revolutionary means of payment, and they are therefore highly unlikely to affect the role of the U.S. dollar or require a response with a CBDC.A second broad argument raised by proponents of CBDCs is that a Federal Reserve CBDC would improve access to digital payments for people who currently do not keep bank accounts because of their expense, a lack of trust in banks, or other reasons. This is a worthwhile goal. However, I believe we can promote financial inclusion more efficiently by taking steps to make cheap, basic commercial bank accounts more available to people for whom the current cost is burdensome, such as the Bank On accounts developed in collaboration between the Cities for Financial Empowerment Fund and many local coalitions.7 Between 2011 and 2019, the percentage of households that are unbanked dropped from 8.2 percent to an estimated 5.4 percent.8 Banks and regulators are working to shrink this percentage further still. I am far from convinced that a CBDC is the best, or even an effective, method to increase financial inclusion.9Last, some believe that a Federal Reserve CBDC would spur and facilitate private-sector innovation. This is an interesting issue that merits further study. I am puzzled, however, as to how a Federal Reserve CBDC could promote innovation in a way that a private-sector stablecoin or other new payment mechanism could not. It seems to me that there has been considerable private-sector innovation in the payments industry without a CBDC, and it is conceivable that a Fed CBDC, or even plans for one, might deter private-sector innovation by effectively "occupying the field."In brief, the potential benefits of a Federal Reserve CBDC are unclear. Conversely, a Federal Reserve CBDC could pose significant and concrete risks. First, a Federal Reserve CBDC could create considerable challenges for the structure of our banking system, which currently relies on deposits to support the credit needs of households and businesses. An arrangement where the Federal Reserve replaces commercial banks as the dominant provider of money to the general public could constrict the availability of credit, fundamentally alter the economy, and expose the public to a host of unanticipated, and undesirable, consequences.10Among other potential problems, a dominant CBDC could undermine the consumer and other economic benefits that accrue when commercial banks compete to attract customers.A Federal Reserve CBDC could also present an appealing target for cyberattacks and other security threats. Bad actors might try to steal CBDC, compromise the CBDC network, or target non-public information about holders of CBDC. The architecture of a Federal Reserve CBDC would need to be extremely resistant to such threats—and would need to remain resistant as bad actors employ ever-more sophisticated methods and tactics. Designing appropriate defenses for CBDC could be particularly difficult because, compared to the Federal Reserve's existing payment systems, there could be far more entry points to a CBDC network—depending on design choices, anyone in the world could potentially access the network.11Critically, we also would need to ensure that a CBDC does not facilitate illicit activity. The Bank Secrecy Act currently requires that commercial banks take steps to guard against money laundering.12 Policymakers will need to consider whether a similar anti-money-laundering regime would be feasible for a Federal Reserve CBDC, but it may be challenging to design a CBDC that respects individuals' privacy while appropriately minimizing the risk of money laundering. At one extreme, we could design a CBDC that would require CBDC holders to provide the Federal Reserve detailed information about themselves and their transactions; this approach would minimize money-laundering risks but would raise significant privacy concerns. At the other extreme, we could design a CBDC that would allow parties to transact on a fully anonymized basis; this approach would address privacy concerns but would raise significant money-laundering risks.A final risk is that developing a Federal Reserve CBDC could be expensive and difficult for the Federal Reserve to manage. A Federal Reserve CBDC could, in essence, set up the Federal Reserve as a retail bank to the general public. That would mean introducing large-scale, resource-intensive central bank infrastructure. We will need to consider whether the potential use cases for a CBDC justify such costs and expansion of the Federal Reserve's responsibilities into unfamiliar activities, together with the risk of politicization of the Fed's mandate that would come with such an expansion.To conclude, I emphasize three points. First, the U.S. dollar payment system is very good, and it is getting better. Second, the potential benefits of a Federal Reserve CBDC are unclear. Third, developing a CBDC could, I believe, pose considerable risks.So, our work is cut out for us as we proceed to rigorously evaluate the case for developing a Federal Reserve CBDC. Even if other central banks issue successful CBDCs, we cannot assume that the Federal Reserve should issue a CBDC. The process that Chair Powell recently announced is a genuinely open process without a foregone conclusion, although obviously I think the bar to establishing a U.S. CBDC is a high one. The upcoming discussion paper that constitutes the first step in this process will importantly ask for input from the public. I look forward to reviewing public input on the discussion paper, which will inform the Federal Reserve's ultimate evaluation of a potential CBDC.

     政策考虑 然而，美联储 CBDC 的支持者认为，CBDC 可以解决许多重要问题。比如，他们建议美联储 CBDC 有必要捍卫美元在全球经济中的关键作用。还有人认为 CBDC 将解决美国社会长期存在的经济不平等问题。当我们美联储开始对这些问题进行分析时，我不得不保证和确保 CBDC 是可以解决这些问题中的好工具，同时，我也不得不非常确信 CBDC 的潜在益处，是大于风险的。对此，我持怀疑态度。让我们来看看 CBDC 支持者提出的一些观点。第一个观点是，美联储应该发行一个 CBDC，一方面保护美元免受外国 CBDC 构成的威胁，另一方面是私人数字货币的持续传播。首先，我们从外国 CBDC 的威胁这个角度出发，这一观点假设，如果数字化是直接通过 CBDC 模式而不是通过当前的数字支付系统来实现的，那么会有一些外币将会突然对美元形成挑战。(需要说明的是，这些外币在当前的国际银行系统中都以与美元相同的方式高度数字化，但尚未对国际货币构成重大挑战)。按照这种观点，如果美联储不提供类似的产品，美元将失去其在全球经济中的地位。我认为，随着全球经济和金融体系的不断发展，一些外币(包括一些外国 CBDC)在国际交易中的使用量将比现在更多，这是不可避免的。然而，美元作为全球储备货币的地位，或美元在国际金融交易中的主导货币地位，似乎不太可能受到外国 CBDC 的威胁。美元在全球经济中的作用取决于多个基础，包括美国经济的实力和规模、美国与世界其他国家之间广泛的贸易联系、金融市场，包括美国国债、美元随着时间推移的稳定价值、将美元兑换成外币的便利性、美国的法治和强大的产权，以及可靠的货币政策。这些都不太可能受到外币的威胁，当然也不会受到外币 CBDC 的威胁。 CBDC 的支持者还表示，私人数字货币对美元构成威胁。私人数字货币有多种风格，但为此我将它们分为两类：稳定币和非稳定币，或加密资产，例如比特币。让我们从稳定币开始，稳定币的价值与一种或多种其他资产相关，例如主权货币。有多种现有和潜在的稳定币与美元的价值挂钩。一些人认为，美国必须发行 CBDC 才能与美元稳定币竞争。稳定币是一个重要的发展，重要到引发我们对很多问题的思考。例如，广泛采用稳定币将如何影响货币政策或金融稳定？稳定币如何影响商业银行系统？稳定币是否对政府在货币创造中的作用构成了根本性威胁？在我看来，我们不需要害怕稳定币。美联储历来支持承担责任的私营部门创新。与这一传统一致，我认为我们必须充分考虑稳定币的潜在好处，包括美元稳定币可能为美元在全球经济中带来支持的作用。例如，全球美元稳定币网络可以通过更快、更便宜的跨境支付来鼓励使用美元，并且与 CBDC 相比，它的部署速度可能会更快，缺点也更少。考虑到我们现有的系统涉及(实际上是取决于)私人公司每天创造货币，因此那些担心稳定币代表了前所未有的货币创造，从而挑战了我们的货币主权的观点，是令人费解的。我们确实对稳定币的构建和管理方式有合法且强烈的监管兴趣，特别是在金融稳定问题方面，作为稳定币价值锚的资产池(如果稳定币的使用变得足够普遍)在以下例子中则存在稳定性风险：如果投资多种货币面额；如果是部分准备金而不是全额准备金；如果稳定币持有人对标的资产没有明确的要求；或者，如果资金池投资于除了像中央银行储备和短期主权债券这种流动性最高的资产之外的资产。所有这些因素都会造成「运行风险」——某些触发事件可能会导致大量稳定币持有者一次性将他们的币全部兑换为其他资产，而稳定币系统将无法在保持合理稳定价值的同时满足这种需求。但是这些问题显然是可以解决的。

     事实上，一些稳定币已经被用来解决这些问题。当我们的担忧得到解决后，我们应该对这些产品说「是」，而不是竭力想办法说「不」。其实，将现有支付系统迫在眉睫的改进(例如各种即时支付计划)与结构合理的稳定币的跨境效率相结合，很可能会使发行 CBDC 变得多余。与稳定币相比，比特币等加密资产与主权货币等资产的价值无关。相反，他们寻求通过其他方式在代币中创造价值，通常是一些确保稀缺性的内在机制，例如比特币的挖矿过程，或者像是「匿名性」这种传统支付系统无法比拟的特征。一些人断言，美国必须发行 CBDC 来对抗加密货币，这似乎是错误的。用于创造此类加密资产价值的机制，还确保了该价值具有高度波动性，类似于黄金的波动价值，与比特币一样，其价值的很大一部分来自其稀缺性。同样还与比特币一样，它不会在今天的支付与货币系统中发挥重要作用。

     然而，与黄金不同的是，黄金除了其残留的金融作用之外，还具有工业用途和美学属性，比特币的主要附加吸引力在于其新颖性和匿名性。匿名性将使其成为执法部门审查的目标，而新颖性是一种快速浪费的资产。黄金总是会发光，但新颖性会逐渐消失。因此，比特币及其同类产品几乎肯定仍将是一种有风险的投机性投资，而不是一种革命性的支付方式，因此它们极不可能影响美元的作用或需要 CBDC 做出回应。 CBDC 支持者的第二个观点，是美联储 CBDC 将为那些目前由于开支、对银行缺乏信任或其他原因而没有银行账户的人提供一个获得数字支付的方式。这其实很有价值，但是，我相信我们可以通过采取措施为这些人们提供更便宜的基础商业银行账户，例如与金融赋权城市基金合作开发的银行账户，从而更有效地促进金融包容性。2011 年至 2019 年期间，没有银行账户的家庭比例预估从 8.2% 下降到 5.4%。银行和监管机构正在努力进一步缩小这一比例。我非常不相信 CBDC 是增加金融包容性的最佳方法，甚至可能都不会有效。最后，一些人认为美联储 CBDC 将刺激和促进私营部门的创新。这很有趣，值得进一步研究。然而，令我感到困惑的是，美联储 CBDC 如何以私营部门稳定币或其他新支付机制无法做到的方式促进创新。在我看来，在没有 CBDC 的情况下，支付行业已经出现了相当多的私营部门创新，可以想象，美联储 CBDC，甚至一个 CBDC 的计划，都可能会阻止私营部门的创新。简而言之，美联储 CBDC 的潜在益处尚不清楚。相反，美联储 CBDC 可能会带来的风险非常具体。首先，美联储 CBDC 可能会给我们银行系统的结构带来相当大的挑战，目前该系统依赖存款来支持家庭和企业的信贷需求。美联储取代商业银行作为向公众提供资金的主要提供者的安排可能会限制信贷的可获得性，从根本上改变经济，并使公众面临一系列意外和不良后果。在其他潜在问题中，占主导地位的 CBDC 可能会破坏商业银行竞争吸引客户时产生的消费者和其他经济利益。美联储 CBDC 也可能成为网络攻击和其他安全威胁的目标。有人可能会试图窃取 CBDC，甚至破坏 CBDC 网络或获取 CBDC 持有者非公开信息。美联储 CBDC 的架构需要对此类威胁具有极强的抵抗力，并且需要持续保持抵抗力，因为攻击者采用了越来越复杂的方法和策略。为 CBDC 设计适当的防御措施可能特别困难，因为与美联储现有的支付系统相比，CBDC 网络的接入点可能多得多。因为根据设计选择，世界上任何人都有可能访问该网络。还有一点非常重要，我们还需要确保 CBDC 不会为非法活动提供便利。《银行保密法》目前要求商业银行采取措施防止洗钱。政策制定者将需要考虑类似的反洗钱制度对美联储的 CBDC 是否可行。设计一个既尊重个人隐私又适当减少洗钱风险的 CBDC 目前来看可能存在不小难度。极端情况下，我们可以设计一个 CBDC，要求 CBDC 持有者向美联储提供有关他们自己及其交易的详细信息。这种方法将最大限度地减少洗钱风险，但会引起重大的隐私问题。而另一个极端情况，我们可以设计一个 CBDC，允许各方在完全匿名的基础上进行交易。这种方法将解决隐私问题，但可能会增加重大洗钱风险。最后一个风险是，发行美联储 CBDC 成本可能非常高昂，而且对美联储而言难以管理。美联储 CBDC 实质上可以将美联储视为一个面向大众的零售银行。这将意味着引入大规模、资源密集型的中央银行基础设施。我们将需要考虑 CBDC 的潜在使用案例是否证明这种成本和将美联储的职责扩展到不熟悉的活动中的合理性，以及这种扩展是否将给美联储带来任务政治化的风险。最后，我强调三点。首先，美元支付系统非常好，而且越来越好。其次，美联储 CBDC 的潜在好处尚不清楚。第三，我认为发行 CBDC 可能会带来相当大的风险。因此，当我们继续严肃评估发行美联储 CBDC 时，我们的工作就结束了。即使其他中央银行成功发行了 CBDC，我们也不能假设美联储应该发行 CBDC。鲍威尔主席最近宣布的过程是一个真正开放的过程，没有定论，尽管显然我认为建立美国 CBDC 的门槛很高。即将发布的讨论文件构成了这一过程的第一步，重要的是征求公众的意见。我期待着审查公众对讨论文件的意见，这将为美联储对潜在 CBDC 的最终评估提供信息。

     全文完。感谢您的耐心阅读，请顺手点个"在看"吧~

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